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THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, THE EVOLUTION 
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. By Stephen P. Hal-
brook.1 Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico 
Press. 1984. Pp. xii, 274. $19.95. 
F. Smith Fussner2 
This book informs, challenges, and should change people's un-
derstanding of the second amendment and of past and present pol-
icy debates. The title is from Patrick Henry; the subtitle describes 
the book's contents. Halbrook summarizes his purpose in the intro-
duction: "After investigating the philosophical, common law, and 
historical backgrounds of the right to keep and bear arms, this work 
analyzes the state and federal court opinions on this topic during 
the last century, concluding with some reflections on public policy." 
The questions that Halbrook has settled as well as those he has 
raised are extremely important. Whether one wants more laws re-
stricting guns, fewer restrictions on gun rights, or legal and histori-
cal evidence about what the second amendment really means, the 
book will provide new facts and insights. The author does not exag-
gerate when he says that this is "the most comprehensive constitu-
tional history of the right to keep and bear arms published to date." 
Beyond that, however, the book implies a range of questions and 
difficult problems about which new books will have to be written. 
Within the limits of a constitutional history of the second 
amendment the work is conclusive-that is, it demonstrates beyond 
reasonable doubt that the second amendment was meant to guaran-
tee an individual right, not an exclusively collective right. It further 
demonstrates that, except for the "black codes" in the South, most 
American laws and court decisions have upheld the right of individ-
ual Americans to keep and bear arms. And Halbrook argues that 
the precedents that seem to imply a "collective right only" are mis-
leading, mistaken, or irrelevant. 
I 
In order to establish the context of the amendment Halbrook 
begins by examining the intellectual traditions pertaining to arms. 
Unfortunately, these early chapters-"The Elementary Books of 
Public Right" and "The Common Law ofEngland"-are the weak-
est in the book. Halbrook is not a trained historian. His surveys of 
I. Attorney and author of Social Philosophy ( 1972). 
2. Professor Emeritus, Reed College. 
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Greco-Roman philosophy, of sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
politics and political theory, and of the English common law tradi-
tion are superficial. Faults and flaws should not be confused with 
deliberate limitation, but Halbrook ought to have explained why he 
omitted biblical and other religious references to arms, violence, 
and the right of self-defense. Historical collaboration would have 
improved and strengthened this pioneering effort to survey the tra-
ditions of armed self-defense. 
It is instructive to consider some of the flaws and errors in Hal-
brook's early chapters, because a more accurate, better balanced ac-
count would enhance Halbrook's main arguments in later chapters. 
Aside from thinking that King John succeeded Henry II, that an 
act of Charles II in 1670 was aimed at forcing "idle, disorderly and 
mean persons" to continue "in a position of serfdom," and other 
historical solecisms, most of Halbrook's errors are negative: failure 
to define terms, failure to convey historical complexity, and a naive 
trust in scissors-and-paste methods. 
Halbrook tends to see the English and European past in black 
and white. He describes a Manichean struggle between commoners 
and aristocrats, rulers and populace, absolutists and republicans-
in short, a long war between benighted elitists, defending force, sub-
mission, and monarchial absolutism, and The People, whose philo-
sophical allies defended freedom and republican virtue. 
If Halbrook had tried to define "absolutism," "divine right," 
"feudalism," "aristocracy," "commoners," "peasants," "serfs" and 
other historical terms including "Whig," he might have presented a 
truer picture of the fight for freedom. He would not have written 
that the death knell of feudalism was struck when "serfs and bur-
ghers" began to acquire firearms, or that "statutes of Henry VII, 
Henry VIII and James II sought to disarm the aspiring bourgeois 
and peasant classes." Arms control legislation did encompass dis-
crimination, but that is scarcely the whole story. 
The reason for criticizing Halbrook's version of English history 
is that the "tensions" and struggles between common law and stat-
ute, between crown and commons, and between gentry and com-
monalty, were much more complex than Halbrook assumes; and 
America's Founding Fathers were not unmindful of historical iro-
nies and complexities. The American Constitution, including the 
second and other amendments, owed almost as much to English 
and American history and legal practice as it did to theory. 
II 
The remainder of the book, which discusses American history, 
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is much better: clear, concise, and very seldom marred by 
oversimplification. 
A recurrent question in American history was what the role of 
the standing army should be, as opposed to the "national guard" 
and the militia (i.e., the armed commonalty). Behind this, of 
course, lay the English experience with dangers to liberty (especially 
Protestant liberty) of a standing army. It is not surprising that "the 
cry for independent militias, composed of citizens who would keep 
their own arms, spread through the colonies at the end of 1774 and 
during the beginning of 1775." Halbrook quotes, appropriately 
enough, Tom Paine's "Thoughts on Defensive War" (1775): "arms 
like laws discourage and keep the invader and the plunderer in awe, 
and preserve order in the world as well as property." 
The phrasing of the second amendment was directly influenced 
by the American experience of having to rely at first on the militia 
to confront the British regular army. The second amendment 
reads: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of 
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not 
be infringed." Every word and phrase in the amendment was care-
fully chosen, as Halbrook demonstrates. The meaning of the word 
"militia" was, and still is, "the armed citizenry," not "the Armed 
Forces" in uniform. The militia, consisting of able-bodied males 
from eighteen to forty-five years of age, is today a legally defined 
group which may be called up in emergencies, as it was in 1941 in 
Hawaii after the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Halbrook discusses the Federalist promise to trust the people 
with arms, and the Anti-Federalist fears that a "select militia," or 
standing army would become a threat to freedom, unless the peo-
ple's right to arms was guaranteed in a Bill of Rights. Tench Coxe, 
a prominent Federalist, urged that "the unlimited power of the 
sword is not in the hands of either the federal or state governments, 
but, where I trust in God it will ever remain, in the hands of the 
people." Federalists and anti-Federalists might quarrel with each 
other about the need for a Bill of Rights, but they all agreed that the 
people at large had the right to keep and bear arms (their own com-
mon, private weapons), not only for self-protection, but for the de-
fense of freedom and a "free state." Halbrook draws a most 
important but frequently disregarded conclusion: 
In recent years it has been suggested that the Second Amendment protects the 
"collective" right of states to maintain militias, while it does not protect the right of 
"the people" to keep and bear arms. If anyone entertained this notion in the period 
during which the Constitution and Bill of Rights were debated and ~atified, it re-
mains one of the most closely guarded secrets of the eighteenth century, for no 
known writing surviving from the period between 1787 and 1791 states such a the-
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sis. The phrase "the people" meant the same thing in the Second Amendment as it 
did in the First, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments-that is, each and every 
free person. 
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What was the origin, then, of the view that the second amend-
ment did not apply to the states? The answer, Halbrook makes 
clear, lay in "the context of slavery." Antebellum commentators 
were unanimous in declaring that the right to keep and bear arms 
was recognized by common law, and was specified in the Bill of 
Rights, but the crucially important question, was whether or not 
slaves were "people" in the context of constitutional rights. 
Halbrook observes that the North Carolina Supreme Court up-
held a slave code provision denying even "free people of color" the 
right to carry firearms, on the ground that they "cannot be consid-
ered as citizens." The Dred Scott decision frankly recognized that if 
blacks were to be considered citizens then they would have all the 
rights of citizens, including the right to keep and bear arms. Depri-
vation of arms was the invisible bracelet of the slave. 
After the Civil War the states of the old Confederacy tried to 
use pretexts of various kinds to keep blacks from acquiring and us-
ing arms. The various "black codes" were in effect attempts to re-
tain slavery without the name. Congress reacted by passing 
legislation that culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 
fourteenth amendment. 
Halbrook contributes greatly to our understanding of the Con-
stitution by demonstrating exactly how and why the courts con-
strued the fourteenth amendment as incorporating the second. By 
establishing the meaning and chronology of second amendment in-
corporation Halbrook disposes of two well-publicized gun prohibi-
tionist arguments: that the second amendment applies only to the 
federal government (states should therefore be free to prohibit pri-
vate gun ownership); and that the second amendment guarantees 
only the right of states to arm their own militias (National Guards). 
Halbrook's summary is uncompromising: "A comprehensive sur-
vey of the committee reports of all states reveals not the slightest 
suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment failed to protect the in-
dividual right to keep and bear arms from state infringement" (p. 
122). 
Perhaps the most striking declaration of incorporation was de-
livered by Justice Brown. Brown wrote that: 
The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amendments to the Constitution, 
commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel 
principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities 
which had from time immemorial been subject to certain well recognized exceptions 
arising from the necessities of the case. In incorporating these principles into the 
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fundamental law there was no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which con-
tinued to be recognized as if they had been formally expressed. Thus, the freedom 
of speech and of the press (art. I) does not permit the publication of libels, blasphe-
mous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public morals or private 
reputation; the right of the people to keep and bear arms (art. 2) is not infringed by 
laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons .... 3 
Halbrook has framed his arguments in these central chapters 
with exceptional care for legal meanings and implications, and also 
with an eye for the apt, and often eloquent, quotation. His own 
style is clear and plain, which suits his purpose-to inform and ar-
gue, not to persuade by turns of phrase. He makes no concessions 
to the bumper-sticker mentality. Reading his book requires concen-
tration but is well worth the effort, It would be unfair to try to 
summarize his arguments and epitomize his evidence. I shall there-
fore only touch upon a few of the central arguments before proceed-
ing to discuss the policy implications of the book. 
Just as geographical benchmarks may be misinterpreted, either 
carelessly or deliberately, so may court decisions. Halbrook demon-
strates in some detail why the leading Supreme Court cases offer no 
support to the gun prohibitionists. 
In United States v. Miller 4 the Court restricted the arms that 
an individual might lawfully possess to personal military or militia 
arms and sidearms. At the same time, however, the Court recog-
nized that the militia was composed of "the entire armed popula-
tion-not simply the organized armed minorities on the payroll of 
the U.S. or state governments." Recent decisions have not defined 
the extent to which the fourteenth amendment incorporates the sec-
ond, but after examining what he calls the "methodology," and the 
sources used by the Supreme Court in various cases, Halbrook con-
cludes that 
in the minds of its framers and the people who adopted it, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protected the fundamental individual right to own and possess firearms from 
state deprivation. If the Supreme Court adheres to its historical methodology ... it 
will someday be compelled to recognize the full worth of this constitutional right. 
(P. 176). 
In his review of state and federal judicial opinions Halbrook 
confronts some of the most controversial, and recklessly argued is-
sues in recent legislative and court history. Pretexts, bad history, 
misrepresentations, logical fallacies, political rhetoric, lies, and 
myths have sprouted like weeds in the fields of argument. The great 
merit of this book is that it sets the historical record straight. That, 
3. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897). 
4. 307 u.s. 174 (1939). 
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of course, does not settle all policy questions, but it does settle some 
important ones. Halbrook is perhaps right to urge that "[o]verly 
restrictive interpretations of the second amendment are associated 
with reactionary concepts in several respects, including elitism, 
militarism, and racism" (p. 195). But the irony is that it is liberals 
who have been leading the fight to destroy the second amendment 
by misinterpreting it. 
Ill 
The real question is not the constitutional status of the right to 
bear arms, but the extent of regulation that may be allowed without 
impairing the purposes of the amendment. On this there is contro-
versy. Kates has argued that since, in the eighteenth century, mili-
tary arms, militia arms, and private arms were much the same 
(cannon excepted) and in the twentieth century they are not, the 
second amendment cannot be interpreted to mean that a citizen has 
the right to arm himself with heavy ordnance-mortars, tanks, 
howitzers, etc.--or with "gangster" weapons (e.g., sub-machine 
guns).5 Legitimate weapons for self-defense (or for the defense of 
freedom by militiamen) must be "lineally descended" from the 
kinds of militia arms known to the Founders. Restrictions on the 
size, purpose, calibre, and nature of weapons do not violate the sec-
ond amendment, according to Kates. Furthermore, "neither regis-
tration nor permissive licensing are per se violative of the 
amendment since they operate only to exclude gun ownership by 
those upon whom the amendment confers no rights"-namely, 
felons, juveniles, and madmen. 
Halbrook took issue with Kates.6 In a subsequent debate 
Kates accepted Halbrook's evidence that "to keep and bear arms," 
means that individual citizens may bear arms in public (carrying 
weapons is not just for members of the organized militia). But 
Kates maintained that other legal restrictions--on "carrying con-
cealed," for example-are still fully constitutional. What strikes 
this reader is the extent to which Kates and Halbrook agree about 
ends, and their willingness to be persuaded by evidence as to means. 
Recent scholarship has helped to dispel two myths-the one, 
propounded by gun control advocates, is that only ignorant, rowdy 
red-necks oppose gun controls; the other, favored by a few writers 
in the popular gun press, is that the worst "gun grabbers" are media 
5. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 
82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983). 
6. Halbrook To Bear Arms for Self-Defense: Our Second Amendment Heritage, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1985, at 28. 
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elitists and cracked eggheads in universities. What is obvious is that 
many people, including scholars, are polarized over the issues of 
gun control, crime control, and the strategies for achieving each. 
The greater the disagreements, the more strident the argu-
ments, the more likely it is that evidence, reason, and compromise 
will give way to slogans, hatreds, and ultimatums. What the Con-
stitution means is not only what the founders thought and wrote 
(history records the fact that slavery was once constitutional), but 
also what we today, after our best efforts to understand the aspira-
tions embodied in the document, make of it. The Constitution and 
its history constitute common ground, disputed but still shared by 
those who would limit and by those who would extend the right to 
keep and bear arms. 
That Every Man Be Armed challenges the constitutional inter-
pretation of gun prohibitionists. Halbrook's evidence cannot be ig-
nored, nor can his arguments be dismissed. Those who choose to go 
on believing prohibitionist pronouncements about the meaning of 
the second amendment will have to do so in spite of the facts. 
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING: 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ART OF POLITICS. 
By Lief H. Carter.t New York: Pergamon Press. 1985. Pp. 
xviii, 216. Cloth, $29.50; paper, $12.95. 
Gregory Leyh 2 
If a play is any good, any act of it, any scene of it, any character of it, can be 
interpreted fifteen different ways, each one as good as the other .... The script itself 
is merely the raw material on which a group of collaborators have got to work. It is 
not the finished article. That idea is merely the invention, for the most basely mate-
rialistic reasons, of literary professors. 
Tyrone Guthrie 
This is a time of political and intellectual ferment in constitu-
tional theory. Several impressive books arguing for one or another 
preferred theory of constitutional jurisprudence have recently 
caught our attention. Increasingly, also, constitutional scholars are 
turning to philosophy for clarification of the central issues in consti-
tutional interpretation. The general effort to forge a conscious 
I. Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia. 
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, lllinois Wesleyan University. I would like 
to thank Karen Gervais for her comments on an earlier draft. 
